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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW  
EN BANC 
 
VOLUME 63  OCTOBER 2010 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Memoriam: Richard A. Nagareda (1963-2010) 
The editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review respectfully dedicate this 
Roundtable to the memory of Professor Richard A. Nagareda. 
______________________________ 
 
 Introduction: 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart  
Stores, Inc. 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch 
 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., as a case, is almost as 
expansive as its defendant.1 For nearly the past ten years, the world 
has watched as Betty Dukes and six other women representing female 
 

 Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Richard 
Nagareda and the editors of the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW for inviting me to introduce this case. 
I was deeply saddened to learn of Richard’s untimely death and dedicate this Introduction to 
him. He has been a tremendous mentor to me over the years and was unfailingly generous with 
his time, comments, and encouragement; he challenged me to push new ideas, explore their 
incentives on lawyers and the courts, and rethink what was possible. He is truly irreplaceable.  
 1. 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010). For some of the key documents filed in the case along with 
a timeline, see Wal-Mart Class Website, http://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html (for a 
timeline, go to “For the Press”) (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
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Wal-Mart workers have sued the new Goliath for discriminating 
against women in its pay and promotion policies. Although 
employment class actions tend not to make the popular headlines, this 
is far from an ordinary case: it has been publicized by The Nation’s 
Liza Featherstone and political activists like Wal-Mart Watch.2 As 
initially certified by the district court, the class members included 
approximately 1.5 million women, which effectively turned the class 
into a Goliath of its own. Yet, it’s the class-certification process 
working this transformative magic that’s at the heart of the current 
controversy in Dukes. 
Given Wal-Mart’s size, anything it does, or, in this case, is 
alleged to have done, is going to be big. (After all, 138 million people 
shop at Wal-Mart every week.3) The question, in part, is how big. 
Although this initial 1.5 million figure made headlines around the 
world, after an en banc rehearing with a split 6-5 majority, the Ninth 
Circuit held that class members who were no longer Wal-Mart 
employees when plaintiffs filed suit lacked standing to pursue 
equitable relief, which would cut the class by two-thirds, to around 
500,000 women.4 The court also held that plaintiffs satisfied Rule 
23(a)’s requirements of commonality, typicality, numerosity, and 
adequacy; the district court properly included injunctive and 
declaratory relief as well as back pay under Rule 23(b)(2); and the 
district court abused its discretion by including punitive damages 
within the Rule 23(b)(2) class without considering whether those 
damages predominated. 
The Ninth Circuit explored two questions in great detail, both 
of which underpin Wal-Mart’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Unites States Supreme Court: (1) whether common questions existed 
under Rule 23(a)(2), and (2) whether back pay and punitive damages 
could be included within a (b)(2) class without running afoul of the due 
process clause. As to the first question, the court observed that 
common questions did exist, namely, “whether Wal-Mart’s female 
employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate 
 
 2. See, e.g., LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR 
WORKER’S RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (Jo Ann Miller ed., 2004); Liza Featherstone, Wal-Mart Values, 
THE NATION, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/wal-mart-values; 
Wal*Mart Watch, http://walmartwatch.com.  
 3. FEATHERSTONE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 4. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578 n.3, 623. The Ninth Circuit did suggest, however, that the 
district court might certify a separate class for former employees that sought back pay and 
punitive damages. Id. at 623. 
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policies” and whether those “policies or practices are discriminatory.”5 
As to the second question—whether and when Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions can include claims for monetary relief—the Ninth Circuit held 
that although back pay could be included within a Rule 23(b)(2) class, 
punitive damages were far more questionable.  
The relative simplicity of these questions belies the tangled 
doctrinal web that lurks beneath them. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
straddles the substance-procedure divide at nearly every turn. As 
Richard Nagareda has explained, “A deep and increasingly important 
trend in contemporary class certification disputes concerns the degree 
to which ostensible battles over conflicting proof on the certification 
question are the stalking horse for something else: underlying 
disputes that often have little to do with the proof or the facts and 
everything to do with the proper meaning of governing law.”6 Dukes is 
but the latest example of this trend.  
This introduction to Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. aims to set 
the table for what promises to be a robust, carefully considered, and 
thought-provoking discussion between Robert Bone, Alexandra Lahav, 
Greg Mitchell, and Richard Nagareda. Accordingly, what follows is a 
concise overview of the legal background and current debate over the 
two procedural issues that the Ninth Circuit explored in detail—how 
to evaluate Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement when common 
questions heavily implicate the case’s merits, and when a Rule 
23(b)(2) class can include relief apart from injunctive or declaratory 
relief without endangering due process.  
I. THE CLASS CERTIFICATION STANDARD AND RULE 23(a)(2) 
Understanding the class-certification debate in Dukes and Wal-
Mart’s claim that the Ninth Circuit improperly relieved plaintiffs’ of 
their burden of proof requires some background knowledge of 
certification. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion began by tackling 
the question of whether the district court should consider the case’s 
substantive merits while ruling on class certification. The question 
itself takes us back to a much-cited passage in the Supreme Court’s 
1974 opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: “We find nothing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any 
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in 
 
 5. Id. at 612. 
 6. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 97, 101 (2009). 
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order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”7 
With this admonition firmly in mind, courts refused to consider any 
evidence that looked too much like substance, even if it also implicated 
Rule 23’s standards. But Eisen concerned class notice, not the 
propriety of class certification. The district court in Eisen justified 
shifting the costs of notifying class members to the defendant by 
conducting a preliminary inquiry into the merits and explaining that 
the defendant seemed liable. Justifiably, the Court was concerned that 
this proclamation would prejudice the defendant in later proceedings. 
Nevertheless, after Eisen, courts shied away from a merits-like 
inquiry during certification and left those questions for summary 
judgment motions. 
Eight years later, in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, the Court 
directly considered certification and held that a district court must 
“probe behind the pleadings” and satisfy itself “after a rigorous 
analysis” that the class meets Rule 23’s prerequisites.8 In the minds of 
many lower-court judges, this created an antagonistic juxtaposition: 
How could they satisfy Falcon’s rigorous inquiry requirement without 
running afoul of what they viewed as Eisen’s prohibition on inquiring 
into the merits?  
As the lower courts struggled to navigate this question, the 
decision over whether to certify a class became increasingly important. 
Now, most judges wait to hear motions for class certification until 
after ruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary 
judgment, which means that most cases settle soon after they’re 
certified. Because class certification marks the case’s near end rather 
than its beginning, a spate of appellate court opinions has pushed 
district courts to take a closer look into the merits during 
certification—at least insofar as the merits overlap with Rule 23’s 
certification requirements.9 These opinions situate Eisen as a case 
about notice and take seriously Falcon’s probing, rigorous analysis. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs must now prove that they have met Rule 23’s 
requirements by a preponderance of the evidence, and courts must 
resolve any factual or legal disputes that relate to certification even 
when those disputes touch on the merits. 
 
 7. 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974).  
 8. 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982). 
 9. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008); Oscar 
Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2007); In re IPO Sec. 
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
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In Dukes, the Ninth Circuit principally followed this trend, but 
noted that appellate courts’ increased willingness to look into the 
merits largely developed in securities class actions, specifically fraud-
on-the-market cases. In contrast, when plaintiffs present statistical 
evidence in pattern-or-practice employment discrimination cases, that 
evidence “does not overlap with the merits, it largely is the merits.”10 
The evidence plaintiffs use to establish Rule 23(a)(2) commonality is 
the same evidence that the court will ultimately use to determine the 
merits. Further, as a procedural matter, Rule 23(a)(2) simply requires 
a common question of law or fact, a threshold much lower than that in 
Rule 23(b)(3) where common issues must predominate over individual 
ones.  
Both the Dukes dissenters and Wal-Mart, in its petition for 
certiorari, took issue with the majority’s approach and argued instead 
that plaintiffs must produce “ ‘[s]ignificant proof that an employer 
operated under a general policy of discrimination’ before a class can be 
certified.”11 Believing that plaintiffs had introduced significant proof, 
the Dukes majority required a “rigorous analysis” just as Falcon 
suggested. And, in keeping with Eisen, it prohibited a free-floating 
inquiry into the merits where Rule 23’s requirements and the merits 
failed to overlap.12 But, to underscore the distinction between pattern-
or-practice and fraud-on-the-market cases as well as between Rule 
23(a)(2) commonality and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance, it cautioned 
that Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality inquiry required plaintiffs to 
establish, not answer, common questions of law or fact. Answering 
those questions, the Ninth Circuit advised, is a task best left to 
summary judgment motions or trial. 
Determining the class-certification standard opened the door to 
yet another question: If courts can look into the case’s merits insofar 
as they bear on the certification requirements and if plaintiffs must 
prove they’ve met those requirements by a preponderance of the 
evidence, how far should courts go in evaluating the reliability of 
plaintiffs’ evidence? For example, to meet their burden of proof, the 
Dukes plaintiffs had to put forth evidence of a common discriminatory 
 
 10. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 591. 
 11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (No. 10-277) 
(quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Wal-Mart-petition-8-25-10.pdf; see also Dukes, 603 F.3d 571, 632 (Ikuta, 
J., dissenting) (discussing when evidence introduced by a single plaintiff can aid the certification 
decision). 
 12. Id. at 592; Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC (forthcoming, 2010) (manuscript at 11). 
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policy. Accordingly, they offered evidence about Wal-Mart’s corporate 
practices, policy, and culture; statistics on gender disparities; and 
anecdotal evidence of gender bias. To establish Wal-Mart’s corporate 
culture, plaintiffs relied on testimony from Dr. William Bielby, a 
sociologist who used a social framework analysis to suggest that Wal-
Mart’s culture includes gender stereotyping. They also offered 
testimony from a statistician, Dr. Richard Drogan, who ran regression 
analyses for each of Wal-Mart’s forty-one regions, and a labor 
economics expert, Dr. Marc Bendick. Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart 
offered experts of its own. 
How should courts assess this competing evidence during 
certification? Because the expert testimony bears on both Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality and the heart of the case, must it satisfy Daubert and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or some lesser standard? Over the past 
ten years, courts have accepted a range of testimony based on 
standards far more lenient than Daubert. But in light of the increased 
rigor with which courts inquire into certification requirements that 
touch the merits, they have become more willing to perform a full 
Daubert analysis when the expert’s testimony is critical to 
certification.13 This makes sense. It would be difficult for a court to 
resolve the necessary factual and legal questions related to 
certification without depending on reliable evidence.  
On the Daubert question, the Ninth Circuit heavily discussed 
the issue, but ultimately concluded that Daubert failed to address 
Wal-Mart’s objections. The district court found that Dr. Bielby 
“provide[d] a foundation for his opinions” and that Wal-Mart did not 
challenge his methodology.14 Daubert, of course, does not test whether 
the expert’s testimony is persuasive, only whether it is scientifically 
reliable. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that it was “enough that 
Dr. Bielby presented scientifically reliable evidence tending to show 
that a common question of fact—i.e., ‘Does Wal-Mart’s policy of 
decentralized, subjective employment decision making operate to 
discriminate against female employees?’—exists with respect to all 
members of the class.”15 The dissenters, on the other hand, argued 
that the district court should have conducted a full Daubert analysis; 
the district court’s conclusion that the report was not “so flawed that it 
lack[ed] sufficient probative value to be considered in assessing 
 
 13. See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2010); In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 315 n.13 (3d Cir. 2008). Both cases applied a 
full Daubert analysis. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–93 (1993). 
 14. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 602. 
 15. Id.  
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commonality” should have constituted legal error.16 Moreover, as the 
dissent noted, Wal-Mart challenged Dr. Bielby’s methodology, 
particularly whether his theory had been scientifically tested and 
whether he considered contrary facts and research.17 
Subjecting Dr. Bielby’s testimony to a Daubert analysis of any 
sort raised yet another substance-laden procedural question. His 
methodology employed what’s known as a social framework analysis. 
This kind of analysis is particularly controversial when used to opine 
(as Dr. Bielby did) that a specific workplace’s policies and practices 
make decisions like compensation and promotion vulnerable to gender 
bias. Thus, is his testimony the kind of thing that Daubert should 
screen from the factfinder (i.e., is this a question about the scientific 
validity of the expert’s reasoning or methodology), or is this simply an 
issue about whether his testimony is ultimately persuasive? If it is the 
latter, then persuasive to whom and for what purpose: to the judge 
deciding whether commonality exists under Rule 23(a)(2), to the judge 
on a motion for summary judgment or the jury at trial, or to all at 
various stages in the lawsuit? The answers to these (and related) 
questions have been debated both between the Dukes majority and the 
dissenters and among scholars, one of whom—Greg Mitchell—will 
appear in the pages of this Roundtable discussion. 
Setting the table for this debate requires providing some 
background. Both the Ninth Circuit in its first decision and Dr. 
Bielby’s expert report cited a book by John Monahan and Laurens 
Walker to support the legitimacy of social framework evidence.18 In a 
later article, John Monahan, Laurens Walker, and Greg Mitchell 
explained that “general social science research can provide a valuable 
context for deciding case-specific factual issues,” but those general 
findings “cannot be linked by an expert witness to the facts of a 
specific case.”19 Those links, they argued, “must be recognized as 
 
 16. Id. at 638–39 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189, 
192 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).  
 17. Id. at 640 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s Daubert Motion to 
Strike Declaration, Opinion, and Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert William T. Bielby, Ph.D., at 8, 
19–22, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (Civil Action No. C-01-2252 MJJ), 
available at 2003 WL 24689917. 
 18. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1178 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Declaration of William 
T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 5, Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Civil Action No. C-01-2252 MJJ), available at 2003 
WL 24571701. The cited authority is JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at Ch. 5 (4th ed. 1998). 
 19. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, The Limits of Social Framework 
Evidence, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 307, 308 (2009) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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arguments to be made by the attorneys, rather than evidentiary proof 
that can be offered by expert witnesses.”20 Melissa Hart and Paul 
Secunda, on the other hand, have argued that “district courts are well 
within their discretion to admit social framework expertise that 
addresses the general research on organizational behavior and social 
cognition theory and that also examines and offers opinions on the 
policies and practices in operation in the particular workplace.”21 
For its part, the district court found Dr. Bielby’s testimony 
relevant to determining whether a common question of fact existed as 
a Rule 23(a)(2) matter and thought he provided a sufficient foundation 
for his opinions.22 Here, it bears mention that appellate courts review 
both class certification and Daubert questions under the abuse of 
discretion standard, which means that appellate courts reverse 
district court decisions only after a strong showing that the district 
court abused its discretion. Accordingly, as noted, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s analysis, observing that “whether the jury 
was ultimately persuaded by [Dr. Bielby’s] opinions was a question on 
the merits” and that (perhaps erroneously), “Wal-Mart did not 
challenge [that] the methodology[] raised a question ‘of corporate 
uniformity and gender stereotyping that is common to all class 
members.’ ”23 In sum, even after requiring a rigorous analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s rulings on Rule 23(a)(2) based 
on plaintiffs’ factual evidence, expert opinions, statistical evidence, 
anecdotal evidence, and evidence of Wal-Mart’s subjective 
decisionmaking. 
II. RULE 23(b)(2) AND DUE PROCESS 
Against the backdrop of this merits-related debate enters yet 
another certification question: To what extent can or should a 
mandatory, non-opt out Rule 23(b)(2) class include requests for back 
pay and punitive damages, relief that intuitively sounds a lot like 
monetary remedies? In fact, the question of whether back pay and 
punitive damages are considered legal or equitable relief (or, in more 
 
 20. Id. at 308; see also John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual 
Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715 
(2008) (arguing that social science can only provide a context for facts of the case). 
 21. Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 62 (2009). For Monahan, 
Walker, and Mitchell’s response, see Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, supra note 19. 
 22. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 23. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 602 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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workable terms, divisible or indivisible relief) matters a great deal, 
both to class certification and the right to a jury trial. This is the other 
question that Wal-Mart has asked the Supreme Court to consider. 
Understanding why it matters requires understanding both the 
procedural and substantive pieces of the puzzle. 
The first half of this puzzle is procedure; it’s explained in the 
language of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) speaks in terms of equitable 
relief and permits class certification when “the party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”24 By contemplating 
equitable remedies and presuming class cohesion, this standard 
avoids monetary remedies and the due process rights that attach to 
property. It thereby paves the way for a mandatory, non-opt out class, 
which was precisely what the 1966 Advisory Committee had in mind 
to further desegregation litigation. 
The second half of the puzzle is substantive. When Congress 
enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, its menu of remedies 
included a declaratory judgment that the defendant violated the Act in 
its employment practices and an injunction to prevent the defendant 
from continuing to discriminate—both clearly equitable remedies. But 
as civil-rights litigation evolved, the Supreme Court added back pay to 
the list of available remedies.25 This payment compensated plaintiffs 
for the difference between their current position and the position they 
would have been in absent the employer’s discriminatory practices. 
Courts and litigants were careful to argue that back pay was different 
from ordinary monetary damages because it flows automatically from 
the defendant’s violation of Title VII. However dubious this distinction 
is, casting back pay as something other than a legal remedy avoided 
the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, a result that 
1960s-era civil-rights plaintiffs in the South preferred. 
Two events, one judicial and one legislative, threatened to 
disrupt this delicate balance of certifying Title VII claims as Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions even though they contained requests for back 
pay. First, in 1985, the Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum 
v. Shutts held that class members have the right to opt out of a class 
when their claims involve legal relief—i.e., money. Monetary damages 
 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). For an in-depth history of Rule 23(b)(2) and the policy 
motivating it, see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications 
for the Modern Class Action, FLA. L. REV. (Sept. 17, 2010 draft at 53) (forthcoming) (on file with 
author). 
 25. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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invoke the “property” portion of the due process clause’s protection 
against deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”26 But footnote three in Shutts left something of a loophole. It 
limited the Court’s holding “to those class actions which seek to bind 
known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money 
judgments. We intimate no view concerning other types of class 
actions, such as those seeking equitable relief.”27 The word 
“predominately,” first mentioned in an Advisory Committee Note on 
Rule 23(b)(2), became the key to maintaining the pre-Shutts balance 
and, as we’ll see, the cornerstone of Wal-Mart’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari. So long as equitable relief predominated over back pay, 
courts could avoid triggering due process rights, including the right to 
opt out. 
Second, in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to add 
compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages to 
plaintiffs’ remedial options. Although back pay seemed harmless 
enough to characterize as somehow equitable, compensatory and 
punitive damages were a different matter. So, Congress’s amendment, 
intended to give plaintiffs additional relief and encourage civil-rights 
litigation, had the ironic consequence of making a Rule 23(b)(2) 
employment discrimination class harder to certify and class relief 
harder to obtain. Given this turmoil, one might wonder why plaintiffs 
would choose a (b)(2) class at all, why not use (b)(3) instead? But from 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ perspective, (b)(2) offers two comparative 
advantages over (b)(3) classes: plaintiffs don’t automatically have the 
right to receive notice or opt out (which avoids diminishing attorneys’ 
fees), and, more importantly, common issues don’t have to 
predominate over individual ones. The latter point is of particular 
importance when the class definition includes everyone from hourly 
“demo girls,” a women’s-only job handing out free food samples, to 
cashiers, greeters, and salaried managers.28 It likewise shifts the focus 
to a common, but complex, array of company-wide discriminatory 
practices that could be cured through a declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief.  
To date, the Supreme Court has shown its interest in the due 
process issue, but given little guidance. It granted certiorari on the 
issue in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance, a price-fixing antitrust class 
action certified in the Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), but 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.  
 27. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 28. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 578; FEATHERSTONE, supra note 2, at 13. 
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then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.29 Justice O’Connor, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, vigorously 
dissented from the Court’s dismissal and underscored the due process 
issue’s importance. Nevertheless, in a per curiam opinion, six justices 
explained that the appeal required them to resolve a hypothetical 
question already foreclosed by res judicata; the parties settled the 
dispute and thereby mooted the question. Moreover, by mentioning 
the Rules Enabling Act, the justices hinted at their underlying 
concern: including some monetary damages within a mandatory class 
could be unconstitutional and call the Court’s own rule-making 
authority into question. Although the Supreme Court has never found 
that a federal rule violates the Rules Enabling Act—for obvious 
reasons—at times, it has worked hard to avoid the issue.30  
These two events—the Court’s Shutts opinion and Congress’s 
1991 Title VII amendments—plus the added confusion from the 
Court’s non-decision in Ticor Title, have caused the lower courts to 
split mightily over what “predominantly” means, when due process 
requires the right to opt out, and whether to certify (b)(2) classes 
requesting back pay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, 
and punitive damages. Before the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dukes, 
the cases fell into two rough categories. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits took a strict approach and certified only classes with 
“incidental damages.”31 Of these, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Allison 
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. is the best known. It held that “monetary 
relief predominates in (b)(2) class actions unless it is incidental to 
requested injunctive or declaratory relief. By incidental we mean 
damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the 
claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”32 This 
standard allowed enough wiggle room to award back pay, but 
prevented plaintiffs from bringing claims for punitive or compensatory 
damages. On the other hand, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Co., the Second Circuit echoed Judge Dennis’s dissent in 
 
 29. 511 U.S. 117 (1994). 
 30. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–06 (2001). Just 
last March in its Shady Grove decision, a majority of the Court held that Rule 23 falls within the 
Rules Enabling Act. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010). The opinion was, however, badly divided with the court splitting 4-1-4 and Justice 
Stevens concurring with Justice Scalia to provide the vote supporting Rule 23.  
 31. Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 649–50 (6th Cir. 2006); Cooper v. 
Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 720 (11th Cir. 2004); Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 216 
F.3d 577, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2000); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
 32. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 (emphasis omitted). 
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Allison, which expressed concern over undermining Title VII’s use, 
and opted for a contextual balancing approach.33 This approach 
allowed district courts to certify (b)(2) classes so long as the injunctive 
or declaratory relief predominated over compensatory and punitive 
damages and class treatment furthered judicial economy by making 
the case more efficient. 
The Ninth Circuit’s Dukes opinion is the latest in this long line 
of cases struggling to square Rule 23(b)(2)’s mandatory nature with 
the due process clause in light of Title VII’s full remedial menu. The 
Dukes court rejected both the Allison approach and its own earlier 
approach in Molski v. Gleich, which adopted Robinson’s reasoning.34 
In their place, it created a new case-by-case balancing test to 
determine when monetary relief predominates. District courts should 
evaluate the “objective effect of the relief sought” by considering 
whether monetary relief will “determine[] the key procedures that will 
be used,” “introduce[] new and significant legal and factual issues,” 
“require individualized hearings,” and “raise particular due process 
and manageability concerns.”35  
Not surprisingly, back pay remained an appropriate award 
under the new standard just as it had been under both Allison and 
Robinson. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are unlikely to 
withstand the new test on remand: they would be decided by a jury, 
not a judge; they would introduce a new factual question because 
plaintiffs must prove that Wal-Mart acted with malice; and the size of 
a punitive-damage award could raise manageability concerns. Yet, 
because the punitive-damage claim was premised on a class-wide 
theory, manageability concerns were far less worrisome than they 
would have been if the court had to determine damages individually. 
After insinuating that punitive damages might not survive its 
new balancing test, the Ninth Circuit suggested using a hybrid 
approach, something that both judges and class action scholars have 
toyed with for years. Hybrid class actions would allow claims for 
indivisible relief, such as a declaratory judgment and an injunction, to 
proceed under a mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) class, and would certify a 
separate Rule 23(b)(3) class with respect to divisible, monetary 
damages. This reading of Rule 23(b) harmonizes with Rule 23(c)(4), 
which allows courts to certify particular issues.  
 
 33. 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 34. 318 F.3d 937, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 
571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 35. Id. at 617. 
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Accordingly, under the hybrid approach, the district court could 
certify the liability question as well as the request for class-wide 
injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). It could then 
guard against any due process violations by certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class for back pay and punitive damages, which would allow class 
members to opt out (or, under a traditional analysis, it could include 
back pay in the Rule 23(b)(2) class). This would preserve members’ 
due process rights with regard to claims for divisible, monetary relief 
by giving them notice, an opportunity to be heard (through the 
objection process), and the opportunity to opt out.  
What is less clear from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is how well 
this hybrid approach works in tandem with the Seventh Amendment’s 
Reexamination Clause, preclusion, and what Wal-Mart claims as its 
statutory and constitutional right to rebut the discriminatory 
inference as to each class member.36 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Allen v. International Truck and Engine Corp., the basis for an 
illustrative example in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation, provides some clarity on the Seventh 
Amendment and preclusion questions.37  
Allen suggested that a hybrid class might provide a way 
around the inequity that resulted in Allison in light of Congress’s Title 
VII goals. The court could certify the equitable issues under (b)(2), 
handle them on a class-wide basis, have a jury resolve the equitable 
issues, and then handle the damages claims either individually or, as 
the Dukes court contemplates, as a (b)(3) class. That way, once the 
jury resolves the factual issues, its opinion binds the defendant 
through issue preclusion principles and avoids the Seventh 
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause issue by having only one jury 
pass on the facts. 
What remains unclear is whether Wal-Mart has a substantive 
right under the law of employment discrimination to present 
individualized defenses to each plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief. 
Depending on the answer to that question, Allen raises one possibility: 
to the extent that certain divisible remedies flow from one 
discriminatory practice adjudicated in the (b)(2) class (such as 
punitive damages), the court could certify those damages under Rule 
 
 36. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (No. 10-277), 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Wal-Mart-petition-8-25-
10.pdf. 
 37. 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, illus. 5 (2010). Illustration 1 in section 2.02 is helpful as well. 
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23(b)(3). It could then handle other damage issues individually, if that 
is truly what Wal-Mart wants.  
In sum, taking the Ninth Circuit’s suggested hybrid approach 
to punitive-damage claims—and perhaps even to back pay—would 
provide one way for the Supreme Court (if it grants certiorari) to 
resolve the due process issues inherent in including damage claims in 
a mandatory class action while avoiding at least one sticky Rules 
Enabling Act problem. The question of whether Wal-Mart is entitled 
to assert individualized defenses, and, if so, how this affects 
certification, persists. 
Because I’ve been tasked with setting the table for the rich 
discussion to follow, I’ve raised more questions than answers, forsaken 
many of the more nuanced arguments in favor of clarity, and tried to 
refrain from engaging the merits of these questions, as tantalizing as 
they are. The issues raised in Dukes give renewed meaning to Justice 
Reed’s remark in Erie that “[t]he line between procedural and 
substantive law is hazy . . . .”38 I’ve tried to lift the haze by distilling a 
jumble of complex issues into the simplest terms possible. Whether 
the Supreme Court will provide additional clarity by granting Wal-
Mart’s petition for a writ of certiorari remains to be seen. In the 
interim, however, I look forward to what promises to be an engaging 
Roundtable discussion.  
 
 
 38. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). 
